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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jerry Lee McClain appeals from his judgments of conviction for domestic 
violence in the presence of a child, intimidating a witness, and violation of a no-contact 
order. Additionally, Mr. McClain was found to be a persistent violator. Mr. McClain 
appeals, and he asserts that the State submitted insufficient evidence to support the 
persistent violator finding, and that the district court erred by admitting an unredacted 
version of an interrogation between Mr. McClain and a detective because the interview 
contained prejudicial other acts evidence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
At the time of trial, Mr. McClain had been married to Janna McClain for seven 
years; they had a son who was two and one-half years old. (Tr., p.178, L.23 - p.179, 
L.S.) On the evening of May 3, 2010, their son was fussy and was running a fever. 
(Tr., p.179, Ls.12-14.) That evening, Mrs. McClain was in her son's room trying to get 
him to go to sleep. (Tr., p.179, Ls.17-21.) According to Ms. McClain, Mr. McClain came 
into the room that evening and asked if this was her way of not wanting to be around 
him or sleep with him; she replied that their son was feverish. (Tr., p.180, Ls.7-18.) 
Mr. McClain asked if she would bring the child to their room; she did this and the child 
fell asleep in about an hour. (Tr., p.181, Ls.1-10.) Mrs. McClain put the child to bed 
and returned to her bedroom. (Tr., p.181, Ls.1S-20.) 
When she got back to her bedroom, Mr. McClain asked her to perform oral sex, 
which she did. (Tr., p.182, Ls.16-20.) She testified that she did this for about an hour 
and stopped; according to Mrs. McClain, when she stopped, Mr. McClain pulled her hair 
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and said, "bitch, I didn't tell you to stop. Keep going." (Tr., p.184, Ls.1-4.) She said she 
was "kind of shaken a lot" and in pain, but she continued for about 20 minutes. 
(Tr., p.184, Ls.5-15.) When she stopped again, she says, he kicked her on the side of 
her head and she fell onto her back. (Tr., p.184, Ls.16-23.) According to Mrs. McClain, 
her husband kept kicking her with his feet to where she fell off the bed. (Tr., p.185, 
Ls.7-9.) She testified that he then got on top her and restrained her. (Tr., p.185, Ls.12-
13.) According to her, he hit and slapped her and covered her mouth because she was 
screaming, and said, "bitch, that will be the last time you scream. You want the 
neighbors and everybody to hear?" (Tr., p.185, Ls.19-23.) 
Mrs. McClain testified that this happened for about five minutes and then 
Mr. McClain got up and used the restroom. (Tr., p.186, Ls.5-13.) When he came out of 
the restroom, he said, "okay, now finish," and she starting performing oral sex again. 
(Tr., p.186, Ls.21-25.) She testified that she was crying and could hardly move; after 
awhile he said, "okay, now turn over," and she turned over and they had intercourse. 
(Tr., p.187, L.3 - p.188, L.7.) Their son was in his room down the hall; neither of their 
bedroom doors we,:e completely closed. (Tr., p.188, Ls.8~17.) 
Mr. McClain got ready for work; he went and brought their son into their room, 
turned on a movie for him, kissed him good-bye, and left. (Tr., p.188, Ls.20-25.) He 
came home for lunch but said nothing about what happened the previous morning. 
(Tr., p.189, Ls.9-11.) Mrs. McClain's mother came over later in the day and 
Mrs. McClain told her what happened. (Tr., p.191, Ls.15-22.) At one point, Mr. McClain 
called her mother's phone; they yelled at each other and Mr. McClain told her mother to 
leave. (Tr., p.192, Ls.15-17.) Her mother left, and later that afternoon law enforcement 
arrived at her residence. (Tr., p.193, Ls.1-4.) 
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Mrs. McClain went with law enforcement to FACES, where she met with 
Detective Brechwald and a nurse named Cindy Cook. (Tr., p.195, Ls.6-23.) Ms. Cook 
asked Mrs. McClain to participate in a sexual assault exam, which she refused 
"because I didn't understand everything that was really going on at the time." 
(Tr., p.195, Ls.5-12.) 
After Mr. McClain was arrested, he began calling her from the jail, and she took 
his calls. (Tr., p.196, Ls.7-14.) According to her, Mr. McClain asked her to change her 
story. (Tr., p.196, Ls.15-17.) 
On cross-examination, Mrs. McClain acknowledged that she had told the grand 
jury that, regarding oral sex, Mr. McClain told her, "if you don't want to do it, then don't," 
to which she replied, "I don't mind." (Tr., p.202, Ls.7-14.) She told the officers that she 
and Mr. McClain would have oral sex, then attempt vaginal intercourse, and this 
happened more than one time. (Tr., p.203, Ls.7-11.) Mrs. McClain also stated that at 
one point, her mother did not want her to be with Mr. McClain because her mother was 
in love him. (Tr., p.209, Ls.23-25.) Mrs. McClain also told the detective that her mother 
had Hved with her sister's husband in a romantic relationship. (Tr., p.210, Ls.3..,10.) 
Mr. McClain was questioned by Detective Brechwald in this case, and a DVD of 
this interview was played for the jury. (Tr., p.284, Ls.3-5; State's exhibit 59A.) 
Mr. McClain objected to this recording coming in without being redacted to prevent 
prejudicial evidence of other bad acts from being presented to the jury. (Tr., p.223, L.8 
- p.226, L.18.) Mr. McClain had made a pre-trial objection to the first 57 minutes and 
20 seconds the recording and the final four minutes of the recording. (Tr., p.13, LS.10-
15.) The court ruled at that time that the entire recording would be admissible. 
(Tr., p.19, Ls.14-15.) The recording was played for the jury. (Tr., p.284, Ls.6-8.) 
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While incarcerated in the Ada County Jail, Mr. McClain made several calls to 
Mrs. McClain; counsel for Mr. McClain stipulated to the fact that Mr. McClain had been 
served with a no-contact order at the time the calls were made and that the recording 
system at the jail was operating accurately at the time the calls were made. (Tr., p.305, 
Ls.15-19, p.309, Ls. 22-25.) 
Mr. McClain was charged with rape and domestic violence in the presence of a 
child relating to the events of May 3-4, 2010, and was charged with intimidating a 
witness and violating a no-contact order relating to the calls he made to Mrs. McClain 
while incarcerated. (R., # 38576, pp.25-26; R., # 38577, pp.26-27.) 1 Persistent violator 
enhancements were filed in both cases. (R., # 38576, p.43; R., # 38577, p.33.) He was 
acquitted of rape but found guilty of the remaining charges. (Tr., p.397, L.16 - p.398, 
L.7.) 
The trial then proceeded to Part II, concerning the persistent violator 
enhancement. (Tr., p.398, L.17). The State alleged only two prior felonies. (State's 
Exhibits 62 and 63.) Counsel stipulated to the admission of the exhibits, but argued to 
the jury that Exhibit 63 did not indicate whether the charge, an assault in Oregon, was a 
misdemeanor or a felony. (Tr., p.409, Ls.7-10.) The jury also had a question regarding 
this exhibit and gave the court the following note: "because we lack a clear definition of 
assault III as a felony in 1991 in Oregon, we are at an impasse on Question 2." 
(Tr., p.419, Ls.14-18.) The parties agreed to keep the jury deliberating, and the jury 
eventually found Mr. McClain to be a persistent violator. (Tr., p.427, Ls.13-25.) 
Mr. McClain then filed a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, which was denied. 
(R., # 38577, pp.95, 98.) 
1 The cases were consolidated both for trial and appeal. (R., #38577 pp.2, 32.) 
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The district court imposed the following sentences: twenty years, with ten years 
fixed, for domestic violence; twenty years, with ten years fixed, for intimidating a 
witness; and one year fixed for violating the no-contact order. (Tr., pA56, L.14 - pA57, 
L.14.) The court ordered the sentences to run concurrently. (Tr., pA57, Ls.11-14.) 
Mr. McClain appealed. (R. # 38577, p.112.) He asserts that the State submitted 
insufficient evidence to support the persistent violator enhancement conviction and that 
the district court erred by admitting the unredacted recording of his interrogation. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the State present insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that 
Mr. McClain was a persistent violator? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted the un-redacted copy 




The State Presented Insufficient Evidence At Trial To Support The Jury's Finding That 
Mr. McClain Was Guilty Of Being A Persistent Violator 
A. Introduction 
At the trial on Part" of the Information in this case, the State did not prove that 
Mr. McClain had two prior felonies. Specifically, the information regarding the prior 
conviction in Oregon was not sufficient to support his conviction. 
B. The State Presented Insufficient Evidence At Trial To Support The Jury's Finding 
That Mr. McClain Was Guilty Of Being A Persistent Violator 
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution precludes conviction 
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime with which a defendant is charged. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); 
see also State v. Gittens, 129 Idaho 54, 57 (Ct. App. 1996). A judgment of conviction, 
entered upon a jury verdict, must be overturned on appeal where there lacks substantial 
competent evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the 
prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State v. Cortez, 135 Idaho 561, 562 (2001); State v. Nelson, 131 
Idaho 210,219 (Ct. App. 1998). 
Mr. McClain asserts that because of the lack of evidence, reasonable minds 
could not reach the same conclusion as to whether he had been convicted of two prior 
felony offenses. The standards for an appellate court to review the sufficiency of the 
evidence to sustain a conviction are set forth in State v. Peite, 122 Idaho 809, 823 
(Ct. App. 1992). There, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that: 
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[a] conviction will not be set aside where there is substantial evidence 
upon which any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. On appeal, we 
construe all facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, in favor of 
upholding the jury's verdict. Where there is competent although conflicting 
evidence to sustain the verdict, we will not reweigh the evidence or disturb 
the verdict. 
Id. (citations omitted). "For evidence to be substantial, it must be of sufficient quality 
that reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion." State v. Johnson, 131 Idaho 
808, 809 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 128 Idaho 580, 586 
(1996)). 
In order to establish that Mr. McClain was a persistent violator, the State was 
required to prove that Mr. McClain had been convicted of two prior felonies; a persistent 
violator enhancement only applies to a "person convicted for the third time of the 
commission of a felony." See I.C. § 19-2514. The State failed to do so. 
The parties stipulated to the introduction of State's exhibits 62 and 63, which 
were the prior judgments. (Tr., p.405, Ls.21-25.) State's exhibit 63, the Oregon 
judgment, is the judgment at issue in this appeal.2 The State alleged that Mr. McClain 
had been convicted of assault in the third degree in the Oregon. (Tr., p.403, Ls.19-23.) 
The State made the following argument regarding the Oregon judgment: 
You can see at the top of the certified judgment of conviction that it was 
entered in Malheur County, Oregon. You can see the defendant's name, 
Jerry Lee McClain. You can see the case number there. You can see 
2 The transcript indicates that Exhibit 63 contains both the Oregon judgment and the 
indictment in that case. (Tr., p.40?, L.23 - p.408 , L.19.) However, on appeal, Exhibit 
63 contains only the indictment. See State's Exhibit 63. Counsel for Mr. McClain has 
contacted the district court and has been informed the judgment is not part of the exhibit 
in its possession. See Motion to Augment, being filed contemporaneously with this 
Brief. However, because the transcript makes it clear that the State was relying on the 
indictment to prove that the prior conviction was a felony, Mr. McClain believes that the 
current record is sufficient to raise the current issue. Should the State assert that the 
record is insufficient, Mr. McClain will assert a due process violation because the lack of 
the Oregon judgment in the record is no fault of Mr. McClain. 
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that he was convicted of assault number three - or assault in the third 
degree. 
And then up in the corner, you can see that the judgment of conviction 
was entered on August 21 of 1991. 
And then if you flip back to the page that contains the indictment in this 
case, which is also part of the judgment of conviction here, you can see 
that this is a felony. In Count I, it specifically states there "unlawfully, 
feloniously, and intentionally." 
And, again, this is all part of State's Exhibit 63. And these are self-
authenticating documents, so you can consider them as true and correct 
copies. 
(Tr., p.40?, L.23 - p.40B, L.19.) In response, counsel for Mr. McClain made the 
following argument: 
The third page of that document is the indictment. In Count I, he is 
charged with assault in the first degree, which is a felony. 
Going back to the first page, he was found - he was convicted of the 
following offense: Assault third degree. 
It does not indicate whether that is a felony or misdemeanor charge. I 
don't see that on the document. Here the state has to prove that both of 
these charges are felonies. 
(Tr., p.409, Ls.1-10.) The State responded, "part of the reason that you're being given 
the indictment in this case is because it's not as clear as the Canyon County judgment. 
But you can see, referring to this document, the indictment, that this is a felony." 
(Tr., p.409, Ls.15-20.) The State thus asserted that it had proven the prior convicted 
was a felony because of the indictment. The State was incorrect. 
The State alleged that Mr. McClain had been convicted of assault in the third 
degree, and that this was a felony. (Tr., p.403, Ls.1B-23.) The indictment upon which 
the State relied was an indictment for assault in the first degree. See State's Exhibit 63. 
The State acknowledged that it was only the indictment which indicated that any crime 
was a felony. (Tr., p.40B, Ls.10-15.) However, the indictment was not for assault in the 
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third degree. While the indictment may have been sufficient to prove that assault in the 
first degree was a felony, the State was required to prove that assault in the third 
degree was a felony. (See Tr., p.403, Ls.19-23.) 
The jury recognized this problem. It submitted the following question to the court: 
"In the county of Malheur, State of Oregon, is assault III considered a felony?" 
(Tr., p.413, Ls.4-7.) The district court even stated, "I have a doubt about whether or not 
assault III in Malheur County, Oregon, is or is not a felony." (Tr., p.414, Ls.13-16.) The 
court responded to the jury's question by reminding them to consider only the evidence 
before them. (Tr., p.416, Ls.2-5.) The jury subsequently sent a note to the district 
court, stating, "because we lack a clear definition of assault III as a felony in 1991 in 
Oregon, we are at an impasse on Question 2." (Tr., p.419, Ls.14-18.) Mr. McClain 
requested that the jury keep deliberating, and the jury eventually returned a guilty 
verdict on the enhancement. (Tr., p.427, Ls.22-25.) 
Mr. McClain then filed a Rule 29 for judgment of acquittal, which was denied. 
(R., # 38577, p. 95; 98.) Due to the fact that the State only demonstrated that assault in 
the first degree as a felony, and it was required to establish that assault in the third 
degree was a felony, that there is insufficient evidence to support the persistent violator 
conviction. Because there was insufficient evidence, the district court also erred by 
denying the motion for a judgment of acquittal. 
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The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Admitted The Unredacted Copy Of 
Mr. McClain's Interrogation 
A. Introduction 
The district court in this case erred when it overruled Mr. McClain's objection to 
admitting the whole of the taped interrogation. First, the district court ignored its prior 
ruling regarding the admissibility of the prior bad acts evidence involving Mr. McClain. 
In its prior ruling, the district court correctly determined that this evidence was not 
admissible because it demonstrated mere propensity or bad character rather than 
common scheme or plan. Because the references in the interrogation to these prior bad 
acts were prejudicial, and because there was no showing of a common scheme or plan 
that would render these allegations of prior bad acts otherwise admissible, the district 
court erred in not requiring the tape of this conversation to be redacted to exclude the 
references to acts other than those that were part of the charges in this case. 
Second, the district court further erred when it determined that the potential for 
undue prejudice in admitting this tape in un-redacted form did not substantially outweigh 
its probative value. The district court failed to actually review the un-redacted version of 
the taped phone conversation, and therefore was unaware of exactly what types of 
allegations of uncharged misconduct were contained on this tape. Had the district court 
actually reviewed the tape prior to ruling, the court would have been aware of the 
numerous allegations of, and statements regarding, uncharged misconduct that were of 
little to no relevance and were highly prejudicial. Moreover, the district court failed to 
recognize the potential prejudice of this evidence at all, and thereby could not have 
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conducted a proper weighing of that prejudice against the probative value of these 
allegations. 
B. Standard Of Review 
This Court generally reviews a district court's determination to admit prior bad 
acts evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51 (2009). The 
review for an abuse of discretion involves resolution of three issues: (1) whether the 
district court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the district 
court acted within the outer bounds of its discretion and consistently with applicable 
legal standards; and (3) whether the district court reached its decision through an 
exercise of reason. Id. However, upon review of the district court's determination to 
admit prior bad acts evidence pursuant to LR.E. 404(b), this Court reviews the district 
court's relevancy determination de novo. See State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818, 824 
(Ct. App. 2009). It is only the district court's balancing of the potential for prejudice 
against the probative value of the evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
Grist, 147 Idaho at 52. 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Admitted The Unredacted Copy 
Of Mr. McClain's Interrogation 
The district court in this case overruled Mr. McClain's objection to admitting 
State's Exhibit 59A, Mr. McClain's interrogation. (Tr., p.223, Ls.17-21.) Mr. McClain 
cited to the court's prior ruling that evidence of prior bad acts committed by Mr. McClain 
were inadmissible. (Tr., p.224, Ls.1-8.) Counsel pointed out specific references to prior 
bad acts in the interrogation. (Tr., p.224, Ls.10-14.) Specifically, counsel noted that at 
the 13th minute, Mr. McClain acknowledged that he had put his kids through a bunch of 
"bullshit" before. (Tr., p.224, Ls.10-12.) At the 31 st minute, Mr. McClain stated, "My wife 
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has hurt me. I've hurt people." (Tr., p.225, Ls.4-6.) In minutes 54 through 57, the 
detective discussed "peoples' capabilities to snap," and Mr. McClain stated, "I've been 
that person before." (Tr., p.226, Ls.6-9.) When asked for a response, the State stood 
on its previous response where the district court had already ruled that the DVD was 
admissible. (Tr., p.226, Ls.22-25.) The court, without any analysis, simply followed, 
"that will be the ruling of the court." (Tr., p.227, Ls.1-2.) This was error. First, the 
district court's prior ruling was based on objections to the detective's statements and to 
relevance. (Tr., p.13, L.3 - p.19, L.15.) The objections raised later in trial were to 
different statements by Mr. McClain. Second, the objected-to evidence was 
inadmissible other acts evidence prohibited by IRE 404(b). 
"Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person to show action in conformity therewith." Grist, 147 Idaho at 52. It 
may be admissible, however, if relevant to a material issue at trial other than propensity. 
Id. One of the purposes for which such evidence may be admissible is to show a 
"common scheme or plan." Id. at 52-54. However, a bare assertion that uncharged 
conduct falls within a common scheme or plan is insufficient to demonstrate 
admissibility of prior bad acts evidence. Instead, the State must establish that the 
uncharged conduct and the charged offense are factually "so related to each other that 
proof of one tends to establish the other," and the district court must carefully examine 
evidence offered for the purpose of showing a common scheme or plan to determine 
whether the requisite relationship exists. Id. 
Regarding allegations of uncharged prior acts in this case involving Mr. McClain, 
the district court had already - and correctly - determined that such evidence was 
inadmissible. (Motion in Limine Tr., p.41, Ls.18-19) It was the State's position from the 
13 
beginning of this case that the DVD contained "no mentions of any prior acts of violence 
between these two. There's no mention of the cycle of power and controL" (Motion in 
Limine Tr., p.58, Ls.17-25.) While the State is correct that there was no specific 
discussion of a prior crime, Mr. McClain's statements clearly reference prior bad acts. 
This was apparently not recognized either by the State or the district court. 
The un-redacted recording of the interrogation contained references to 
Mr. McClain putting his children through "bullshit" before. He stated that he had hurt 
people before, and that at one point in his life, he was the kind of person that could 
"snap." (See Exhibit 59A). This is evidence of other acts or wrongs, none of which are 
relevant to a disputed issue in this case. 
Because the district court failed to recognize that the interrogation contained 
other acts evidence, it wrongfully admitted the interrogation without requiring redaction 
of the references to prior acts by Mr. McClain. The evidence was not relevant to an 
issue other than propensity and the district court erred by admitting the unredacted 
recording. 
D. The District Court Erred By Failing To Balance The Probative Value Of The 
Evidence Against Its Prejudicial Effect 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 provides that even relevant evidence may be 
excluded if the probative value of that evidence is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice. I.R.E. 403. The limitations on the admissibility of evidence 
contained in I.R.E. 403 comprise part of the district court's duty to exercise a gate-
keeping function at trial in order to prevent improper and highly prejudicial evidence 
from being presented to the jury; and further constitute part of the required 
considerations attendant on the district court when confronted with the admissibility of 
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allegations of prior bad acts. See, e.g., State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 221-222 
(Ct. App. 2009). 
While the district court's calculus of whether the probative value of evidence is 
substantially outweighed by its prejudice is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, this 
discretion is not without limits. As noted by the court in State v. Stoddard: 
This is not a discretion to depart from the principle that evidence of other 
crimes, having no substantial relevancy except to ground the inference 
that [the] accused is a bad man and hence probably committed the crime, 
must be excluded. The leeway of discretion lies rather in the opposite 
direction, empowering the judge to exclude other-crimes evidence, even 
when it has substantial independent relevancy, if in his judgment its 
probative value for this purpose is outweighed by the danger that it will stir 
such passion in the jury as to sweep them beyond a rational consideration 
of guilt or innocence of the crime on trial. Discretion implies not only 
leeway but responsibility. A decision clearly wrong on this question of 
balancing probative value against danger of prejudice will be corrected on 
appeal as an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Stoddard, 105 Idaho 533, 537 (Ct. App. 1983) (quoting MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK 
OF THE LAW ON EVIDENCE § 190 (Cleary ed. 1972)( emphasis added)). 
A trial court does not abuse its discretion in admitting prior bad acts evidence 
where the court individually carefully reviews each piece of evidence that the State 
seeks to admit and evaluates the probative value and potential for prejudice of that 
evidence on a piece-by-piece basis and taking the evidence together as a whole. 
U.S. v. Long, 328 F.3d at 664-665 (D.C. Cir. 2003). In this case, the district court failed 
to perceive that the interrogation contained other acts evidence and thus failed to 
conduct the balancing required by Rule 403. 
It is a condition precedent to the court's ability to engage in the required 
balancing test from I.R.E. 403 that the trial court first recognize what the potential 
prejudice of the challenged evidence is. In this case, by failing to realize that the 
interrogation contained irrelevant 404(b) evidence, the court did not conduct a balancing 
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test. Because the other acts evidence was not relevant to any issue other than 
propensity, it was clearly more prejudicial than probative as it was probative to nothing. 
And references to Mr. McClain putting his children through "bullshit," having previously 
hurt his wife, and having a propensity to "snap" are clearly prejudicial. 
In State v. Hardman, 102 P.3d 722 (Or. Ct. App. 2004), the State sought to 
introduce evidence of a prior alcohol-related motor vehicle accident in order to show the 
defendant's awareness of the dangers of drinking and driving as a component of a 
charge of manslaughter. Id. at 723-724. This evidence was introduced for the purpose 
of establishing that the defendant committed the reckless homicide, "recklessly under 
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life." Id. While 
the trial court determined that this evidence was not relevant, the Hardman Court 
determined otherwise. Id. at 724-727. 
After finding the trial court erred in failing to recognize the evidence as relevant, 
the Hardman Court proceeded to analyze whether the trial court erred in determining 
that the potential for unfair prejudice outweighed the probative value of the evidence.3 
Jd. at 727-728. The Hardman Court held: 
Although the trial court summarily engaged in that balancing enquiry, it did 
so with an erroneous predicate in place. That is, after erroneously 
applying Johns, the trial court concluded that the prior accident was 
irrelevant. The trial court's balancing inquiry under OEC 403, therefore, 
was fatally skewed in favor of a conclusion of nonadmissibility because 
the probative side of the scale had nothing on it. 
Id. at 728. 
3 The Court in Hardman applied Oregon's rule of evidence, OEC 403, to this analysis. 
However, the substance of this rule is virtually identical to I.RE. 403. Compare I.RE. 
403 with O.RS. § 40.160. 
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Based on the failure of the trial court to apprehend the relevance, and therefore 
the probativeness, of the evidence at issue, the Hardman Court determined that the trial 
court's balancing constituted an abuse of discretion. Id. 
The same type of error is present in this case. Just as the trial court in Hardman 
failed to place anything on the probative side of the "scale" for purposes of the I,R.E. 
403 balancing test, the district court here failed to place anything on the side of the 
scale weighing prejudice because it did not recognize the nature of the 404(b) evidence. 
In light of this failure, any balancing inquiry would be fatally skewed from the outset and 
constituted an abuse of the court's discretion. 
In sum, the evidence was prejudicial and not relevant to a disputed issue other 
than propensity. The district court erred by failing to recognize this and thereby 
admitting the unredacted copy of the interrogation. Because the evidence was not 
relevant, any balancing would be skewed and constitute an abuse of discretion under 
IRE 403. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. McClain requests that his persistent violator conviction be dismissed with 
prejudice. He further requests that his remaining convictions be vacated and his case 
remanded for further proceedings. 
DATED this 22nd day of February, 2012. 
JUSTIN M. ~RTjS~ \ 
Deputy St~te ~ppellate Puolic Defender 
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